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 Over the last decade or so, the idea that institutions matter has become widely 
accepted among economists, even including many of the orthodox ones, who used to 
scoff at the idea. Consequently, among those who are interested in the developing 
countries, the “one-size-fits-all” approach of the IMF and the World Bank has been 
increasingly challenged, and attempts are made to incorporate institutional factors in the 
design of policy programmes for developing countries. 
However, studies of institutions have been mostly in microeconomics – such as 
the studies of property rights institutions and corporate governance institutions – and 
political economy – such as democracy and state bureaucracy. In contrast, 
macroeconomics has been almost been an “institution-free-zone”, with the wage 
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bargaining institutions in the developed countries being the only major exception.  
In this chapter, I will try to show that institutions matter also for the macro-
economy a great deal, and therefore that we need to explicitly incorporate institutional 
factors in macroeconomic theory. One innovative feature of the present chapter is that it 
draws extensively on the history of the development of institutions of macroeconomic 
management in today’s developed countries (all historical information are from Chang, 
2002, ch. 3, unless otherwise indicated). While our ultimate interest is the role of 
institutions in the macroeconomic management in developing countries, we believe that 
discussing the historical experiences of today’s developed countries makes it easier for 
the readers to understand that better macroeconomic management requires institution 
building.  
In the discussion, we will show that in the early days of economic development 
in these countries, many of institutions that contemporary orthodox macroeconomic 
theories take for granted – for example, the central bank, income tax, bankruptcy law – 
did not exist or existed only in most rudimentary forms. This made effective 
macroeconomic management extremely difficult, magnifying and prolonging 
macroeconomic problems. It took time and effort for them to construct certain 
institutions of macroeconomic management and thus acquire the ability to manage their 
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macro-economy effectively. This suggests that an improvement in the macroeconomic 
management of today’s developing countries requires conscious efforts at institution 
building. Unfortunately, however, many of the changes in institutions and policies 
currently recommended to the developing countries by the orthodox economists are in 
fact likely to unwind many of the improvements in the institutions of macroeconomic 




2. The Central Bank 
 These days, many people, especially the free-market economists, regard the 
central bank (or more precisely the politically-independent and inflation-focused central 
bank) as one of the foundational stones of capitalism, but it is a relatively recent 
invention in the history of capitalism.  
Although from as early as the 18th century dominant banks (e.g., the Bank of 
England or the large New York banks) were forced to play the role of lender-of-last-
resort in times of financial crises, the establishment of central banking was strongly 
resisted by free-market economists until the late 19th century and the early 20th century. 
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Not understanding the logic of “socialization of risk”, they believed that creating a 
central bank would mean bailing-out imprudent borrowers in times of financial turmoil 
and thus encourage excessive risk-taking (or create what we these days call “moral 
hazard”). This sentiment is best summed up in the remark by the influential 19th-
century thinker, Herbert Spencer, when he argued that “[t]he ultimate result of shielding 
man from the effects of folly is to people the world with fools” (quoted in Kindleberger, 
1996, p. 146).1 As a result, the development of central banking itself – never mind its 
political independence or quality of management – was a very slow and halting process 
in today’s developed countries (for further details, see Kindleberger, 1984). 
However, over time all countries have come to accept the need for the central 
bank, as people have come to realize that the benefits from its ability to stem financial 
panic and thus stabilize the macro-economy by preventing financial panic far outweigh 
the costs that it may carry in the form of “moral hazard”.  
The Swedish Riksbank (established in 1688) was nominally the first official 
central bank in the world, but it did not become a real central bank until 1904, when it 
gained note issue monopoly. The first “real” central bank was the Bank of England, 
                                            
1 The original source is H. Spencer, “State Tampering with Money and Banks” in 
Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative (London: Williams & Northgate, 1891), 
vol. 3, p. 354. 
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which gained note issue monopoly in 1844. Other central banks were established mainly 
in the late 19th and the early 20th century. The Italian central bank gained note issue 
monopoly only in 1926. Although it was established in 1913, the Federal Reserve Board 
did not control 65% of the US banks that accounted for 20% of total banking assets 
until as late as 1929.2 Also, until the Great Depression, the Federal Reserve Board was 
de facto controlled by Wall Street.3 
 
Free market economists of today do not object to the existence of the central 
bank itself in the same way in which their intellectual forefathers did. However, their 
view of what it needs to do is very different from what had convinced people of its need 
in the first place. In the currently dominant view, the central bank’s role is almost 
exclusively defined in terms of maintaining the value of the currency and thus attain 
price stability.4 Its role as a mechanism to enhance broader macroeconomic (and not 
                                            
2 This meant that in 1929 the law “still left some sixteen thousand little banks beyond 
its jurisdiction” (Cochran & Miller, 1942, p. 295). 
3 The most telling evidence is the story of Charles E. Mitchell, head of the National City 
Bank and a director of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Mitchell, in an attempt 
to minimise damage on his speculative activities in the run-up to the Great Depression, 
successfully put pressure on the Federal Reserve Board to reverse its policy of monetary 
tightening announced in early 1929. 
4 And indeed this is the line taken by Friedrich von Hayek, when he proposes the 
scrapping of central banks and argues for free competition among note-issue banks. 
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simply price, but also output and employment) stability by preventing financial panic is 
completely ignored.  
It is well known, of course, that the IMF recommends absurdly high interest 
rates and the immediate closing of weak financial institutions to developing countries in 
a macroeconomic crisis, despite the fact that such measures actually encourage, rather 
than prevent, the spread of financial panic, exacerbating the crisis. It is, however, less 
well known that the IMF has also made the countries under its tutelage grant 
constitutional independence to their central banks and make them focus exclusively on 
price stability. Such change has entrenched a mechanism that significantly reduces the 
lender-of-last-resort function of the central bank. 
 
 
3. Budgetary Institutions 
 Government taxes and spending are often inversely related to the overall level 
of activity in the economy. In an economy where taxes are progressive, when the 
economy is in boom, more people and firms go over the tax exemption thresholds or 
move into higher tax-rate brackets. At the same time, the number of people claiming 
social welfare benefits falls. Consequently, the government net spending falls in relative 
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terms, having a stabilizing effect on the macro-economy. When the economy slows 
down, the reverse is true. This is known as the “built-in stabilizer” function of 
government budget. 
 Capitalist economies did not have this built-in stabilizer from the beginning. In 
the early days, income taxes were considered an affront to capitalism, while social 
welfare spending was minimal, if not totally absent. As the construction of the tax base 
and the introduction of social welfare institutions took time, the establishment of the 
built-in stabilizer happened also took time. 
Income tax was initially only used as an emergency tax intended for war 
financing.5 This in part reflected the political under-representation of the poorer classes 
but also the limited administrative capability of the bureaucracy. This limited 
bureaucratic capacity was indeed one reason why tariffs (the easiest taxes to collect), 
were so important as a source of revenue in today’s developed countries in earlier times 
(and are indeed for many of today’s poorest developing countries). 
Britain was the first country to make income tax permanent, which happened in 
                                            
5 Britain introduced graduated income tax in 1799 to finance the war with France, but 
scrapped it with the end of the war in 1816. Denmark used income tax for emergency 
finance during the 1789 Revoutionary War and the 1809 Napoleonic War. The USA 
introduced a temporary income tax during the Civil War but repealed it soon after the 
war ended (1872). 
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1842. However, the tax was much opposed as an unequal and intrusive measure. John 
McCulloch, one of the most influential economists of the time, argued that income taxes 
“require a constant interference with, and inquiry into the affairs of individuals, so that, 
independent of their inequality, they keep up a perpetual feeling of irritation” (cited in 
Bonney, 1995, p. 434). As late as 1874, the abolition of income tax was a major plank of 
Gladstone’s election platform, although he lost the election. In the USA, the income tax 
law of 1894 was overturned as “unconstitutional” by the Supreme Court. A subsequent 
bill was defeated in 1898, and the Sixteenth Amendment allowing federal income tax 
was only adopted in 1913. However, the tax rate was only 1% for taxable net income 
above $3,000, rising to 7% on incomes above $500,000 (Carson, 1991, p. 540). In 
Sweden, despite its later fame for the willingness to impose high rates of income tax, 
income tax was first introduced only in 1932 (Larsson, 1993, pp. 79-80). 
Somewhat later than the introduction of progressive income tax came the other 
key element of the built-in stabilizer, namely, the establishment of social welfare 
schemes, especially the unemployment benefit. 
Institutions that take some (if not very good) care of its weaker sections have 
always been necessary to guarantee social peace in any human society. Before 
industrialization, this care was provided by extended families, local communities, and 
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religious organizations. However, this started changing with industrialization. 
Industrialization led to urbanization and secularization, which led to the decline in 
institutions like families, communities and religious organizations. Consequently, the 
government began to take a more active role in the provision of social welfare.  
However, before the 1870s, social welfare institutions in today’s developed 
countries were very poor, with the English Poor Law-type legislation, which provided 
only meager help and stigmatized the recipients of state help, at their core.6 The 
inadequate provision of social welfare in times of unprecedented social change meant 
that social tensions reached serious levels by the middle of the 19th century, as we can 
see from the constant (real and imaginary) fear of socialist revolution that gripped many 
of these countries around the time.  
Consequently, modern social welfare institutions started to emerge in the late 
19th century. This was spurred by the increasing political muscle-flexing of the popular 
classes after the significant extension of suffrage during this period and by union 
                                            
6 Such attitude made many countries deprive the recipients of state help of voting rights. 
For example, Norway and Sweden introduced universal male suffrage respectively in 
1898 and 1918, but it was not until 1918 and 1921 respectively that those who had 
received state assistance were allowed to vote. 
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activism.7 Germany was the pioneer in this area. It was the first to introduce industrial 
accident insurance (1871), health insurance (1883), and state pensions (1889). 
Unemployment insurance, a key element in the built-in stabilizer, first emerged in 
France in 1905. Once in place, unemployment insurance spread quickly, with virtually 
all of today’s developed countries (except for Spain and Portugal) establishing it by 
1945. 
 After the Second World War, the importance of government budget started 
growing rapidly with the introduction of more progressive income taxes and more 
generous unemployment insurance. At the same time, the willingness of governments to 
manipulate the budgetary system for macroeconomic purposes has grown thanks to the 
abandonment of the old “balanced budget” doctrine and the rise of Keynesianism. 
While the rise of neo-liberalism since the late 1970s put enormous pressure for “small 
government”, even countries like Britain, a leader in the neo-liberal revolution, has 
found it very difficult to significantly scale down the overall budget and in particular 
welfare spending. 
                                            
7 Of course, there was no one-to-one relationship between the extension of suffrage and 
the extension of welfare institutions. While in cases like New Zealand there is a clear 
link between the early extension of suffrage and the development of welfare institutions, 




In today’s developing countries, the orthodox recipe calls for the contraction of 
an “over-extended” state. Orthodox economists believe that there is a natural incentive 
for government bureaucrats to expand the budgets they control (the so-called “budget-
maximising bureaucracy model” of Robert Niskanen). From this point of view, the 
government, especially in developing countries where there is little outside check on it, 
is almost by definition “over-extended”. Naturally, the prescription is to roll back the 
over-extended state. 
In the process of budget cut, particular emphasis has been put on the cut in 
“premature” welfare spending that orthodox economists see as “unaffordable” for 
developing countries. Fortunately, more recently even some of the orthodox economists 
have come to accept the role of some minimal “social safety net”, acknowledging the 
serious social dislocation and conflict caused by their policies, such as radical trade 
liberalization, ill-conceived financial liberalization or premature opening of the capital 
market. However, this is still not a generalized tendency, and even when there is no 
explicit attack on it, welfare spending is often the first to get the axe, given the weak 
political voice of the poor. Given that welfare expenditure is the most “stabilizing” 
element in the budget, the relative shrinkage of its share in overall budget 
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disproportionately diminishes the role for government budget as an “automatic 
stabilizer”. 
The downward pressure on the size of the budget in the orthodox programme is 
intensified by the inevitable fall in tax revenue that result from this programme. There 
are two key elements. First of all, most orthodox economists believe that progressive 
income tax penalizes high-earners and thus work against “wealth creation”. They 
therefore want overall income tax rates cut and their progressivity reduced. Second, 
trade liberalization, which always constitutes a core element in any orthodox policy 
package, significantly reduces tariff revenue. This is even a bigger blow than cuts in 
income tax, much of which is being evaded in developing countries anyway, because 
tariff revenue accounts for the largest single tax revenue for the poorer countries, given 
their weak capacity to collect other (especially income) taxes. Thus seen, the 
microeconomic policies of the orthodox programme create an even more contractionary 
bias in macroeconomic policy. 
 
 
4. Institutions for Financial Regulation 
 Financial regulation, both domestic and international, has important 
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macroeconomic consequences. Institutions that regulate the kind of assets that financial 
firms (e.g., banks, non-bank financial institutions) can hold, the amount of lending that 
they can make, the extent of deposit insurance, and the rules of their liquidation in times 
of trouble all have great impacts on the stability and the variability of the macro-
economy. They affect the amplitude of the business cycle, the likelihood of asset 
bubbles, the manner in which the bubbles may build up and burst, and the way in which 
the aftermaths of any bubble manifest themselves. For the developing countries, 
institutions that regulate international capital flows have particular importance in 
macroeconomic management, given the small sizes of their financial markets. 
Until recently, the orthodox economists regarded the institutions of financial 
regulation simply as something that needs abolishing – they talked of financial 
“repression” and “liberalization”, as if they were political scientists discussing the evils 
of some totalitarian or authoritarian regimes (no doubt some of them saw financial 
regulation as inevitable in such regime). However, the marked increase in the incidences 
of financial crises in the last two decades of financial liberalisation, especially in 
developing countries, has forced even many orthodox economists to accept the need for 
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better financial regulation, especially cross-border capital control.8 
Of course, developing good institutions for financial regulation is not easy and 
takes time, as we can see from the fact that such regulation was highly inadequate in the 
early days of capitalism.  
Banking regulation took long time to develop in today’s developed countries. In 
the USA, “wildcat banking”, which was “little different in principle from counterfeiting 
operations”, was prevalent until throughout the 19th and the early 20th century (Atack & 
Passell, 1994, p. 103). Although the overall cost of failures of unregulated banks at the 
time is estimated to have been small, bank failures were widespread (p. 104). Even as 
late as 1929, the US banking system was made up of “thousands upon thousands of 
small, amateurishly managed, largely unsupervised banks and brokerage houses” 
(Broagan, 1985, p. 523). Modern banking regulation was introduced in the USA only 
between 1931 and 1935 (the crowning moment being the establishment of the federal 
deposit insurance system in 1935) in an attempt to deal with the aftermath of the Great 
                                            
8 According to the data provided by Eichengreen and Bordo (2000, table 6), there were 
17 financial crises (16 currency crises and 1 “twin crisis” that combines banking and 
currency crises) during the quarter century following the end of World War II (1945-71), 
roughly the period of financial repression in these countries. In the following quarter of 
a century (1973-97) that saw increasing financial liberalisation, the number of financial 
crises increased by 5.6 times to 95 (17 banking crises, 57 currency crises, and 21 twin 
crises).  
 15
Depression, and in particular of the 1933 banking crisis (Calomiris, 2000). Banking 
regulation was introduced only in 1934 in Germany and in 1935 in Belgium. 
As for capital control, it was only after centuries of international financial 
turmoil that today’s developed countries were convinced that they needed to establish a 
system of capital control after World War II. Although the spread of neo-liberalism in 
the last couple of decades have prompted these countries to abandon capital control 
once again recently, rather strict capital control was in place in all of them, except in the 
USA, during the post-WWII period until well into the 1980s. Even the UK, a country 
with history of international financial domination and an early converter to neo-
liberalism, maintained capital control introduced after World War II until the end of the 
1970s.  
 
In the contemporary context, while few would dispute that a “good” set of 
institutions regulating the financial system is essential for macroeconomic stability and 
economic development, there is really no agreement on what is exactly meant by the 
term “good”. To the orthodox economists, what is “good” in this context is determined 
by what (they think) is good for the financial industry. However, this is a very narrow 
view, as what is good for the financial industry may or may not be good for the macro-
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economy or long-term economic development. Two recent institutional changes pushed 
by the orthodox economists are notable in relation to macroeconomic management, 
namely, the abolition or the scaling-down of deposit insurance and the BIS capital 
adequacy standard. 
Many orthodox economists have attributed financial crises in developing 
countries to the existence of (explicit and implicit) deposit insurance, which in their 
view creates “moral hazard” on the part of the banks, which then lend to misconceived 
or speculative projects. Accordingly, the IMF has recommended that countries abolish, 
or at least significantly scale down, deposit insurance. 
One obvious problem with this prescription is that it is not clear whether 
deposit insurance per se leads to poor lending decisions. Deposit insurance does not 
necessarily creates moral hazard for the bank managers who make the lending decisions. 
By definition, it is the depositors who are protected from this arrangement, and not the 
bank managers. Therefore whether deposit insurance gives the bank manager the 
incentive to make imprudent lending decisions will be critically determined by the 
degree to which his/her job security and remuneration depends on the quality of his/her 
decisions, and not merely by the existence of deposit insurance. In this sense, the 
widely-used analogy between deposit insurance and fire insurance is fundamentally 
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misleading, because in the latter case the insured has (some) control over the likelihood 
of the insurance money being paid out, while in the former case the insured (the 
depositor) does not have much meaningful control over the likelihood.  
The point is that, if the bank managers know that they will lose their jobs and 
suffer in reputation when their banks fail, the knowledge that their banks will be bailed 
out by the government does not give them much comfort. In this case, deposit insurance 
will not create moral hazard on the part of the bank managers. Of course, in practice the 
bank managers do not necessarily get fully punished for their poor decisions, but this is 
the result of a poorly designed incentive system for the bank managers, and not the 
result of deposit insurance per se. 
Even if we ignore the above (fundamental) problem, there cannot be a blanket 
case against deposit insurance even from the orthodox point of view. Even many of 
those who advance the deposit insurance story accept that there is a clear benefit from 
such insurance, which is to preserve the stability of the domestic payments system (at 
least McKinnon & Pill, 1998, do that unequivocally). If so, the real question here is 
whether the costs from moral hazard that deposit insurance creates is greater than the 
gains from the greater macroeconomic stability that it provides by preventing bank runs. 
The fact that most developed countries have deposit insurance suggests the gains have 
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been generally far greater. With the deposit insurance gone, the chance of financial 
panic has become greater, with negative implications for macroeconomic management.  
The point is that what is “prudent” for the banking sector itself may not 
necessarily be good for the macro-economy. In times of recession, it is better for the 
banking sector to lend less while it may be better for the macro-economy if it did the 
opposite – we will get back to this issue soon when we talk about the BIS capital 
adequacy ratio. 
 Another recent change in the institutions of financial regulation that requires 
our attention is the BIS capital adequacy ratio standard. This standard has been 
promoted by the orthodox economists as preventing banks from making imprudent 
lending.   
 However, the problem with the BIS standard is that, while it is eminently 
sensible from the individual bank’s point view, it totally lacks any macroeconomic 
perspective. In times of economic recession when asset prices fall, the BIS ratio of a 
bank will fall even without a deterioration of the inherent quality of its lending. In this 
situation, the banks are forced to contract their lending. This is sensible for individual 
banks, but if all of them called in their loans, the economy will worsen, which will put a 
downward pressure on asset prices. This, in turn, will shrink the banks’ asset bases even 
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further, requiring even more contraction in their lending, and thus worsening the macro-
economy even further. In boom times, the opposite will happen. The result is the 
magnification, rather than the dampening, of business cycles.  
 The fact that the BIS ratio magnifies, rather than dampens, the business cycle 
with harmful effects on the macro-economy was clearly demonstrated by the events 
relating to the recent economic troubles in East Asia.  
 First of all, take the case of Japan. The Japanese banks traditionally had lent a 
lot compared to their asset bases, were made to observe the BIS ratio from 1996 at a 
very short notice. This was a particularly unwise decision on the part of the Japanese 
government, as the Japanese banks were then particularly in poor financial states 
following the bursting of the financial and real estate bubbles in the early 1990s. This 
forced the Japanese banks to call in lots of their loans, thus, stamping out any shoot of 
recovery that was in the offing in the country (the Japanese economy grew at over 3% in 
1996 after a few years of slow growth).  
 Particularly hard hit by the re-call of Japanese bank loans were the borrowers in 
other Asian countries, as the Japanese banks naturally started calling in loans from more 
risky borrowers from developing countries first. This contributed to the on-set of the 
1997 Asian crisis. The IMF made things even worse for the crisis-hit countries by 
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forcing them to introduce the BIS standard. Introducing the BIS standard with a short 
transition period in developing countries with weak a banking sector would have been a 
bad move even in a favourable macroeconomic situation. Introducing it in the middle of 
a major financial crisis was a monumental folly. This forced the banks to stop lending 
and, further, to re-call existing loans, thus exacerbating the crisis. For example, in the 
case of Korea, bank lending in 1998 shrank to 1.6% of the pre-crisis level (259 billion 
won in 1998 vs. the average of 15,930 billion for 1996-7) (Shin & Chang, 2003, p. 114, 
table 14.3). It is difficult to imagine how this kind of fall would have been possible 
without the sudden introduction of the BIS ratio, even considering the magnitude of the 
crisis. 
 The problem is that the changes in the institutions of financial regulation 
favoured by orthodox economists, especially the decision to abolish/reduce deposit 
insurance and to introduce the BIS ratio, are based on a fallacy of composition. What 
may be good for an individual bank is not necessarily good for the banking sector as a 
whole, and even less for the macro-economy. The result has been the increased pro-





5. Bankruptcy Laws 
Few people would include the bankruptcy law as an institution of 
macroeconomic management. However, the kind of bankruptcy law a country has 
important implications for its ability to manage the macro-economy. 
In pre-industrial Europe, bankruptcy law was mainly regarded as a means of 
establishing the procedures for creditors to seize the assets of and to punish the 
“dishonest” and “profligate” bankrupt businessmen. With industrial development, there 
came an increasing acceptance that business can fail due to circumstances beyond 
individual control, and not just as a result of individual dishonesty or profligacy. And as 
a result, the bankruptcy law also began to be seen as a way of providing a clean slate for 
the bankrupts to try for a second chance. This transformation of bankruptcy law was, 
together with generalised limited liability, one of the key elements in the development 
of mechanisms for “socialising risk” that allowed the greater risk-taking necessary for 
modern large-scale industries. 
However, at least until the mid-19th century, the bankruptcy law in the UK, the 
then the most industrialized country, remained highly deficient by modern standards. 
Until then, bankruptcy remained the privilege of a very small class of wealthy 
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businessmen, the responsibility for prosecuting laid entirely with the creditors, and the 
system was not uniform throughout the country. There were also problems involved in 
the granting of “discharge”, as it was granted by the creditors and not by courts, which 
deprived many businessmen of the opportunity to make a fresh start. There was also a 
lack of professionalism and corruption among bankruptcy commissioners. In the 1842 
amendment, discharge became the right of courts, not creditors, making it easier for 
bankrupts to get their second chance. However, the coverage of the law was still limited 
until 1849, when it became applicable to anyone who earned their living by “the 
workmanship of goods or commodities”.  
In the USA, the early bankruptcy laws were modeled on the early (pro-creditor) 
English law and administered at the state level. However, until the late 19th century only 
few states had bankruptcy laws at all and these varied from one to another. There were a 
number of federal bankruptcy laws introduced during the 19th century (1800, 1841, and 
1867), but they were all short-lived due to their defective nature (repealed in 1803, 1841, 
and 1878 respectively). It was not until in 1898 that Congress was able to adopt a 
lasting federal bankruptcy law.  
 
Bankruptcy laws in developing countries have attracted an increasing amount of 
 23
attention over the last two decades or so. The large-scale corporate failures that 
followed various economic crises during this period have made people more aware of 
the need for effective mechanisms to reconcile competing claims, transfers of assets, 
and the preservation of employment. The industrial crises in the OECD countries in the 
1970s and the 1980s, the collapse of the Communism and the miserable failure of 
“transition” since the late 1980s, and the 1997 Asian crisis were particularly important 
in this regard. 
In the current debate on bankruptcy law, attention has been paid almost 
exclusively to the microeconomic implications (for a recent literature review in the 
developing country context, see Carruthers, 2000). For example, much of the debate has 
been on whether the bankruptcy law should be lenient or harsh on the debtors. Some 
argue that a harsh law is necessary, as otherwise it can lead to “moral hazard” on the 
part of the debtors and thus to inefficient investment. Others argue that a good 
bankruptcy law should be lenient on the debtors and give them time for restructuring 
and also a chance to “wipe the slate clean”. Still others have debated whether the French 
bankruptcy law that protects the employees of the bankrupt firms has any merit. 
However, very few people in the debate discuss the macroeconomic aspects of 
the bankruptcy law. From the point of view of macroeconomic management, the greater 
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protection of the debtors and the employees will be more beneficial than the protection 
of the creditors. In times of recession, a quick liquidation of enterprises in trouble may 
in fact magnify the recession, while the immediate sacking of workers will also deprive 
income from groups with higher consumption propensity. Of course, the 
macroeconomic cots and benefits will have be set against the microeconomic ones, but 
what is clear is that those who design the bankruptcy law need to take the 
macroeconomic factors into account. 
 
 
6. Price- and Wage-Setting Institutions 
 In the view of most orthodox economists, prices and wages are set by 
competitive forces, unless there are “artificial” rigidities created by interest groups, such 
as industry cartels and unions. Any such rigidity, in their view, is inefficient and, more 
relevant for our concern in this chapter, prevents smooth macroeconomic adjustment. 
 However, by the late 19th century, the kind of competitive markets that the 
orthodox economists regard as their ideals ceased to exist. As the minimum efficient 
scales of production grew, firms gained some degree of price setting power, enabling 
them to engage in “mark-up”, rather than “marginal”, pricing. This increased the 
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possibility for “price wars” and consequently macroeconomic instability. At the same 
time, the increasing unionization (partly made possible by the growing size of firms) 
and the growing class consciousness of the workers, buttressed by the extension of 
suffrage, put an end to the “competitive” labour market (for a more detailed and 
insightful analysis of institutional evolution during this period, see Maier, 1987). 
With these changes, many free-market economists wanted to return to the old 
world of small, price-taking firms and atomized and acquiescent workers. However, it 
was becoming increasingly clear that this was not possible given the technological and 
political changes. Therefore new institutions to manage the new price- and wage-setting 
process had to be created. 
In terms of price setting, cartels were obvious early solutions. They became 
widespread in all of today’s developed countries by the late 19th century. While cartels 
gave stability to long-term investment and increased macroeconomic stability, there 
were obvious problems with them, such as “unfair” competition and their undue 
political influence. Consequently, attempts were made to regulate them. 
The pioneer in this regard was the USA. The country introduced the Sherman 
Antitrust Act in 1890. In this Act, unions were also treated as cartels, and in fact until 
1902 when President Theodore Roosevelt used it against J.P. Morgan’s railways 
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holding company, Northern Securities Company, it was mainly used against unions, 
rather than against large corporations. The Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 banned the use 
of antitrust legislation against the unions.  
During the 19th century, the British state neither supported nor condemned 
cartels and other anti-competitive arrangements. However, until the First World War, the 
courts were quite willing to uphold the validity of restrictive trade agreements. The 
Restrictive Practices Act of 1956 was the first true anti-trust legislation in the sense that 
it assumed for the first time that restrictive practices were against the public interest 
unless proven otherwise.  
In other countries, cartels were even more favourably treated. For example, the 
German state strongly supported cartels and enforced their agreements during the late 
19th century and the early 20th century – in particular the highest court making the ruling 
in 1897 by the highest court that cartel is legal. However, later (in 1923 and 1933 in 
particular), certain restraints on cartels were introduced (although not necessarily well 
implemented). In many other European countries, regulations of cartels did not really 
exist until after World War II. 
In terms of wage setting, after World War I when it became clear that a return to 
the old world of acquiescent labour is impossible, many countries started experimenting 
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with “corporatist” ideas, which tried to resolve the growing social tension by organizing 
interest groups into “corporations” that explicitly coordinated their activities. 
In some countries, such as Germany and Italy, corporatism was more of a slogan 
than an institutional reality exploited by rightwing dictatorships, and consequently 
delivered few results (Maier, 1987, ch. 2). However, some other countries built more 
effective collective wage bargaining institutions with lasting results. Norway and 
Sweden led the way by signing grand compromises between labour and capital in 1935 
and 1938 respectively (the Basic Agreement and the Saltsjobaden Agreement).. 
The most important element of social corporatism was the incorporation of the 
unions in the macroeconomic management process. The unions were given concessions 
in terms of full legalisation of union activities, better welfare provision, and emphasis 
on full employment in government macroeconomic policy management. In return, they 
were asked to accept private ownership and managerial prerogatives in hiring and firing. 
It was expected that giving the unions the power to fully exercise their collective 
bargaining power will make them more “responsible” and calibrate their wage demands 
in line with overall macroeconomic sustainability.  
After World War II many other European economies also adopted “social 
corporatist” wage bargaining institutions. The advantages of “social corporatism” in 
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macroeconomic management were demonstrated during the period of “stagflation” in 
the 1970s and the 1980s, when countries with strong institutions of collective wage-
price bargaining, especially Sweden, Norway, and Austria, had much better 
macroeconomic performances than other countries with “freer” or “more flexible” 
labour markets (Rowthorn and Glyn, 1990). 
 
In the developing countries, product and labour markets tend to be quite 
differently organized from their counterparts in the developed countries.  
Some of their product markets are also oligopolistically organized. The 
weakness, or even absence, of their competition laws means that in these markets prices 
may be even more rigid than their counterparts in the developed countries. On the other 
hand, the developing countries also have a large “informal sector”, where prices are 
more competitively determined and thus less sticky. They also rely heavily on primary 
commodity exports, whose markets are very competitive and therefore their prices 
subject to large price fluctuations.  
In terms of wage setting, the existence of a vast pool of surplus labour means 
that on the whole wages in developing countries are very flexible, even in the “formal” 
sector. Indeed, the falls in real wages have been rather dramatic in many developing 
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countries during recent experiences of economic crises and stagnation. Having said that, 
we must point out that the picture is more complex. In many developing countries, there 
may be individual industries where strong unions exist. In some other countries, notably 
in Latin America, there have been experiments with wage indexation at least for the 
formal sector. 
What is clear is that the institutions for price and wage setting are much more 
heterogeneous in the developing countries than in the developed countries. Given this, 
the dynamics of price- and wage-setting in the former tend to be much more 
complicated than in the latter.  
Notwithstanding this complexity, it is fair to say that on the whole the nature of 
price- and wage-setting institutions in the developing countries make their prices and 
wages more prone to fluctuation than their counterparts in the developed countries. This, 
in turn, means that the macro-economy in the developing countries tend to fluctuate 




 In this chapter, we have examined how institutions have fundamental influence 
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on the behaviour of the macro-economy. The institutions that affect the macro-economy 
include not only “obviously macroeconomic” ones like the central bank, budgetary 
institutions, and price- and wage-setting institutions but also “apparently 
microeconomic” ones, such as institutions for financial regulation and bankruptcy law. 
 In discussing how these institutions influence the macro-economy and therefore 
the scope and nature of macroeconomic policy, we used historical evidence from 
today’s developed countries in order to show how these institutions are not “natural” but 
things that have to be consciously built. Then we discussed the implications of the 
currently orthodox (neo-libeal) position on these institutions for macroeconomic 
management, especially in developing countries.  
 We conclude that the orthodox recommendations for institutional changes are 
based on pre-Keynesian ideas of macroeconomics (as far as the subject can be said to 
have existed then). The institutions that they recommend are the ones that will weaken 
the macroeconomic “stabilizers” that the developing countries have built over the last 
few decades with great difficulty (e.g., cuts in welfare spending) and, even worse, 
magnify business cycles (e.g., inflation-focused central bank, the BIS ratio). Thus, in 
terms of macroeconomic management, these recommended institutional changes are 
likely to turn the clock back to the days when the failure to understand the fallacy of 
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composition made policy-makers so inept at macroeconomic management. 
 The developing countries are already prone to more cyclical behaviours of their 
macro-economy because of their underlying production and institutional structures. To 
make them adopt policies and institutions that are pro-cylical, rather than anti-cyclical, 
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